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Who Benefited from the Bailout? 
Jonathan G. Katz† 
  INTRODUCTION   
The Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) was created to 
respond to a financial panic.1 Some might say that it was 
created in panic. Congress appropriated a huge sum of money, 
gave the Secretary of the U.S. Department of the Treasury 
(Treasury) enormous latitude to spend the money, and provided 
ambiguous and, some might say, contradictory direction on the 
goals and objectives of TARP.2 Treasury, in turn, gave clear 
guidance on how it proposed to use the money—to purchase 
deeply discounted toxic assets from troubled financial institu-
tions—only to shift directions within weeks, when it used 
TARP funds to make capital investments in banks.3  
On October 3, 2010, the TARP program’s authority to in-
itiate new spending officially ended.4 However, as with so much 
of TARP, even the program’s expiration of authority did not re-
ally mean that the program terminated. It only meant that 
Treasury could not initiate new TARP spending programs. It 
 
†  Jonathan G. Katz was Secretary of the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) for twenty years. Since his retirement in January 2006, 
Mr. Katz has served as a consultant on financial services regulation and a 
technical advisor to government regulators in twelve countries. Mr. Katz is 
grateful for the many constructive comments he received on drafts of this Ar-
ticle from, among others, Roger Arner, Zsofia Arvai, James Coffman, and Lar-
ry Promisel. Copyright © 2011 by Jonathan G. Katz. 
 1. See ANDREW ROSS SORKIN, TOO BIG TO FAIL 438–46 (2009). 
 2. See SIMON JOHNSON & JAMES KWAK, 13 BANKERS 164 (2010) (noting 
that TARP gave “the treasury secretary virtually unlimited power to use the 
money as he saw fit”). 
 3. Id. at 167–68. 
 4. OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GEN. FOR THE TROUBLED ASSET 
RELIEF PROGRAM, SIG-QR-10-04, QUARTERLY REPORT TO CONGRESS 5 (2010) 
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could still spend nearly $80 billion in “obligated” but unspent 
funds.5 These funds are in addition to the over $98 billion in 
TARP funds that have been spent and not repaid.6 
The controversy over its creation and the ambiguity of its 
termination are consistent with virtually every chapter in the 
life of TARP. Throughout its life, the TARP program was mis-
understood by the public and misconstrued by the media.7 This 
is puzzling, given the level of independent oversight that the 
program received. When Congress enacted the Emergency Eco-
nomic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA) and created TARP, it 
also created two independent overseers. EESA mandated the 
appointment of a special inspector general for the TARP pro-
gram (SIGTARP) and required the SIGTARP to submit quar-
terly reports to Congress.8 It also created a bipartisan Congres-
sional Oversight Panel (COP) and required it to submit regular 
reports to Congress.9 The reports of the SIGTARP and the COP 
provide an unusually robust and highly independent ongoing 
assessment of TARP. The picture they paint is illuminating 
and, in many respects, different from the prevailing public im-
pression.  
To fully understand TARP and the government’s broader 
response to the financial crisis, one should follow the famous 
advice that Mark Felt (Deep Throat) is said to have given 
Woodward and Bernstein—“follow the money.” In doing so, the 
money trail reveals that the funds expended by TARP were in 
fact merely one component of a much larger governmental in-
tervention that was remarkably similar to governmental re-
sponses to past banking failures. And, absent fundamental 
changes in bank business practices and governmental regula-
tion, other banks will fail and the government will respond 
with other bailouts in the future. 
Part I of this Article describes the government’s actions in 
the financial crisis of 2008, beginning with the collapse of Bear 
Stearns. Part II follows the money with respect to both TARP 
 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. See SORKIN, supra note 1, at 530 (noting the general misunderstand-
ing of TARP when it was enacted); see also Alan Blinder, Op-Ed., Government 
to the Economic Rescue, WALL ST. J., June 16, 2010, at A21 (“TARP must be 
among the most reviled and misunderstood programs in the history of the re-
public.”). 
 8. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. Law No. 111-343, 
§ 121(a), (f ), 122 Stat. 3765, 3788, 3790.  
 9. Id. § 125. 
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and non-TARP funds and assesses those interventions. Part III 
contains a brief summary of past banking failures in the United 
States, demonstrating that the government’s intervention was 
not out of the ordinary. It also discusses how fundamental 
changes in the banking business model, coupled with signifi-
cant industry consolidation, will have consequences for future 
bank failures, which are inevitable. This Article concludes with 
some observations on what regulators must address to reduce 
the consequences of future failures.  
“To paraphrase a great wartime leader, never in the field of 
financial endeavour has so much money been owed by so few to 
so many. And, one might add, so far with little real reform.”10 
I.  THE PRE-TARP MONEY TRAIL   
The story of the financial crisis and the government’s re-
sponse does not begin with congressional enactment of TARP. 
Part I describes the government’s inconsistent responses to 
three financial failures—Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, and 
AIG. 
A. BEAR STEARNS 
When banks fail, banking regulators historically struggle 
to reconcile two frequently conflicting goals—intervening to 
prevent a single failure from metastasizing into a systemic 
failure, or refraining from intervention because of a concern 
that such action will encourage future reckless conduct (the 
“moral hazard” problem).11 In March 2008, with the collapse of 
Bear Stearns, federal regulators were confronted with this 
choice.12  
Bear Stearns (Bear) was a broker-dealer rather than a 
bank.13 It was a major and active participant in the debt mar-
kets where it was one of the largest underwriters of subprime 
 
 10. Mervyn King, Governor of the Bank of Eng., Speech to Scottish Busi-
ness Organizations 3 (Oct. 10, 2009), http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/ 
publications/speeches/2009/speech406.pdf (emphasis added). 
 11. See SORKIN, supra note 1, at 33 (discussing concerns of moral hazard 
associated with the 2008 bailout); Lissa L. Broome, Extraordinary Government 
Intervention to Bolster Bank Balance Sheets, 13 N.C. BANKING INST. 137, 147–
54 (describing the rationale and risks associated with government bailouts). 
 12. See SORKIN, supra note 1, at 69. 
 13. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., SEC, REP. NO. 446-A, SEC’S OVERSIGHT 
OF BEAR STEARNS AND RELATED ENTITIES: BROKER-DEALER RISK ASSESSMENT 
PROGRAM 5 (2008), available at http://www.sec-oig.gov/Reports/AuditsInspections/ 
2008/446-b.pdf. 
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mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and of collateralized debt ob-
ligations (CDO),14 and was also a major participant in the over-
the-counter (OTC) derivatives markets.15 As a broker-dealer, it 
relied on its own capital (raised through equity or long-term 
debt) and money borrowed largely through short-term secured 
transactions (repos) with other banks and financial institutions 
for liquidity.16 In March 2008 Bear’s “overall financing from 
other banks totaled $119 billion.”17 As the concern over the 
firm’s solvency spread, some lenders began insisting on more 
collateral for continued lending and other lenders refused to 
rollover expiring loans.18 The premium to obtain insurance 
against a Bear default, known as a credit default swap (CDS), 
increased 1400 percent in one week.19 At the beginning of 
March, Bear had far more in liquid assets than U.S. Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) regulations required.20 With-
in weeks, it did not.21  
In this instance, the regulators focused on the systemic 
risk problem.22 It was the classic government response; the 
 
 14. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, PRELIMINARY STAFF REPORT, 
GOVERNMENTAL RESCUES OF “TOO-BIG-TO-FAIL” FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 21 
(2010) [hereinafter FCIC STAFF REPORT], available at http://fcicstatic.law 
.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-docs/2010-08-31%20Preliminary%20Staff%20Report 
-%20Too%20Big%20To%20Fail%20Institutions.pdf. 
 15. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-216, FINANCIAL 
REGULATION: A FRAMEWORK FOR CRAFTING AND ASSESSING PROPOSALS TO 
MODERNIZE THE OUTDATED U.S. FINANCIAL REGULATORY SYSTEM 39 (2009) 
[hereinafter GAO FINANCIAL REGULATORY FRAMEWORK REPORT], available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09216.pdf. 
 16. See JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 2, at 158–59. 
 17. WILLIAM D. COHAN, HOUSE OF CARDS 18 (2009) (quoting Kate Kelly, 
The Fall of Bear Stearns: Fear, Rumors Touched Off Fatal Run on Bear 
Stearns, WALL ST. J., May 28, 2008, at A1. 
 18. On March 10 Rabobank, a Dutch bank, declined to roll over a $500 
million loan and informed Bear that it was “unlikely to renew a $2 billion line 
of credit coming due the following week.” COHAN, supra note 17, at 18. “The 
next morning, ING Group NV, another large Dutch bank, followed Rabobank’s 
lead and pulled its $500 million in short-term financing.” Id. at 23. Similarly, 
mutual funds such as Fidelity ($6 billion) and Federated ($4.5 billion) also 
stopped long-standing, overnight repos with Bear. Id. at 33. 
 19. See id. at 21. 
 20. Testimony Concerning the Role of Federal Regulators: Lessons from the 
Credit Crisis for the Future of Regulation Before the H. Comm. on Oversight 
and Gov’t Reform, 110th Cong. (2008) (statement of Christopher Cox, Chair-
man, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission), available at http://www.sec 
.gov/news/testimony/2008/ts102308cc.htm. 
 21. Id. 
 22. See SORKIN, supra note 1, at 69 (according to Fed Chairman Ben Ber-
nanke, the impetus for the Bear Stearns Bailout was the “protection of the 
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government brokered a “private sector” solution. J.P. Morgan 
(JPM) acquired Bear Stearns,23 which was something like an 
arranged marriage between a large insolvent entity and a larg-
er solvent entity made possible by a dowry from the couple’s 
rich and loving Uncle Sam. Uncle Sam’s wedding present in-
cluded a $12.9 billion short-term loan to JPM to facilitate the 
purchase24 and the creation of Maiden Lane LLC (ML I), a spe-
cial-purpose vehicle25 (SPV) to remove $30 billion of toxic debt 
from the consolidated balance sheet—something like paying 
down the bride’s credit cards.26 ML I was financed by a $1 bil-
lion contribution from JPM and a $29 billion loan from the 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York (N.Y. Fed).27 Graciously, 
JPM agreed to assume responsibility for the first billion in 
losses.28 
To make the newlyweds’ adjustment easier, the govern-
ment also gave JPM unprecedented regulatory relief. For the 
first time, the Federal Reserve (Fed) did not require the acquir-
ing bank to consolidate the acquisition onto its balance sheet 
for regulatory capital calculations for eighteen months.29 The 
couple also got a starter home, Bear’s $1.5 billion dollar office 
tower on Madison Avenue.30  
It was a lovely wedding and one that appears to have had a 
happy ending. JPM repaid the bridge loan within days, includ-
ing $4 million in interest.31 As of June 30, 2010, SIGTARP re-
ports that while the balance on the ML I loan was $29.3 billion, 
the fair market value of the assets was $28.4 billion.32 Since 
 
American financial system and the protection of the American economy”).  
 23. JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 2, at 159. 
 24. OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GEN. FOR THE TROUBLED ASSET 
RELIEF PROGRAM, SIG-QR-10-03, QUARTERLY REPORT TO CONGRESS 135 (2010) 
[hereinafter SIGTARP QUARTERLY REPORT, July 2010], available at http://www 
.sigtarp.gov/reports/congress/2010/July2010_Quarterly_Report_to_Congress.pdf. 
 25. A special-purpose vehicle is “an off-balance sheet legal entity that 
holds the transferred assets presumptively beyond the reach of the entities 
providing the assets (e.g., legally isolated).” OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL 
INSPECTOR GEN. FOR THE TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM, SIG-QR-09-03, 
QUARTERLY REPORT TO CONGRESS 95 (2009) [hereinafter SIGTARP 
QUARTERLY REPORT, July 2009], available at http://www.sigtarp.gov/reports/ 
congress/2009/July2009_Quarterly_Report_to_Congress.pdf. 
 26. FCIC STAFF REPORT, supra note 14, at 21. 
 27. Id.  
 28. Id. 
 29. COHAN, supra note 17, at 101. 
 30. Id. at 125. 
 31. SIGTARP QUARTERLY REPORT, July 2010, supra note 24, at 134. 
 32. Id. 
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JPM agreed to assume the first $1 billion in losses, it appears 
to be a net wash for the government. Not bad. 
B. LEHMAN BROTHERS 
Just a few months later, regulators were again confronted 
with the choice of addressing systemic risk or moral hazard 
when Lehman Brothers (Lehman) failed, in much the same 
way as Bear Stearns.33 Following the national criticism of the 
Bear “bailout,” which in the end was not actually a bailout, the 
regulators chose to address moral hazard rather than systemic 
risk.34 While the government actively encouraged the JPM 
takeover of Bear, participating in the negotiation of terms and 
providing substantial financial assistance and regulatory relief, 
it took a different approach with Lehman. In hindsight, this 
was an odd choice. Lehman was a larger firm than Bear, with 
$600 billion in outstanding debt, on which CDSs with a notion-
al amount totaling $400 billion had been written.35  
The government did approach Bank of America and Bar-
clays Bank (Barclays) in the United Kingdom regarding a pri-
vate solution to the Lehman problem.36 While Barclays was in-
terested, Uncle Sam wouldn’t promise the same dowry that 
JPM obtained.37 There was no short-term loan for acquisition, 
no Maiden Lane SPV to take on Lehman’s toxic debt, and no 
promise of regulatory relief to ease the consolidation.38 Fed 
Chairman Benjamin Bernanke, then-Secretary of the Treasury 
Henry Paulson, and current Secretary of the Treasury Timothy 
Geithner (who was at that time president of the N.Y. Fed) have 
consistently explained that no intervention was possible be-
cause they lacked legal authority to do so.39 However, this ex-
 
 33. JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 2, at 173. 
 34. See id. at 162. 
 35. Peter J. Wallison, Systemic Risk and the Financial Crisis, AM. ENTER. 
INST. 4 (Oct. 2008), http://www.aei.org/docLib/20081031_23536OctFSOg.pdf.  
 36. COHAN, supra note 17, at 432–33. 
 37. See SORKIN, supra note 1, at 271 (“Before the call ended, [Barclay’s 
President Bob] Diamond wanted to make another thing clear: He was looking 
for a ‘Jamie Deal’—in other words, he might come looking for some form of 
government help. Paulson stated firmly that no assistance from the govern-
ment would be forthcoming, but added, ‘We’ll figure out how to get you help.’”). 
 38. Id. 
 39. Too Big to Fail: Expectations and Impact of Extraordinary Government 
Intervention and the Role of Systemic Risk in the Financial Crisis Before the Fin. 
Crisis Inquiry Comm’n, 112th Cong. 61 (2010) (testimony of Ben. S. Bernanke, 
Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System), available at 
http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-testimony/2010-0902-Transcript 
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planation is based upon their inability under section 13(3) of 
the Federal Reserve Act to lend money to Lehman because the 
firm lacked sufficient acceptable collateral to support the 
loan.40 Of course the loan could have been made to Barclays, 
not Lehman, just as JPM was the borrower in the Bear deal. It 
is difficult to understand why a Barclays-Lehman deal on the 
same terms as JPM-Bear was not legal. One explanation is that 
this was a choice that reflected timing more than underlying 
facts. After Bear, and just after the government bailout of Fan-
nie Mae and Freddie Mac, the political fallout may have been 
too great. Whatever the reason,41 there was no arranged mar-
riage. Lehman was left at the altar, or more accurately, at the 
funeral home next door to the church.  
The government’s unanticipated about-face surprised and 
panicked an already panicked and fragile market.42 Because 
markets do not cope well with surprise and panic, the market 
response was disastrous.43 
Actually, the Lehman bankruptcy may never end. Legal 
fees alone have passed the $1 billion mark.44 Parenthetically, 
by October 2008 all $400 billion of CDSs in which Lehman was 
the intermediary dealer, plus the $72 billion in CDSs written 
on a Lehman failure, was settled by the Depository Trust 
Clearing Corporation among the CDS counterparties for a net 
total payment of $5.2 billion.45  
 
.pdf (“Lehman did not have enough collateral in terms of financial assets, and 
its going-concern value was tied up completely in its financial operations.”).  
 40. See 12 U.S.C. § 343 (2006). 
 41. There is a great deal of speculation as to why Barclays did not buy 
Lehman (it did buy the broker-dealer subsidiary). The official explanation was 
that it was unable to obtain from the U.K. Financial Services Agency a waiver 
of the requirement that a shareholder vote be taken to approve the acquisi-
tion. For a discussion of the official decisions, see SORKIN, supra note 1, at 
345–49. Unofficially, some believe that the Bank of England insisted on U.S. 
government participation akin to the JPM-Bear deal. 
 42. Id. at 536. 
 43. Id. at 535 (“‘On the day that Lehman went into Chapter 11,’ Alan 
Blinder, an economist and former vice chairman of the Federal Reserve, said, 
‘everything just fell apart.’”).  
 44. Lehman Bankruptcy Fees Top $1 Billion, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Oct. 
19, 2010, 3:21 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/10/19/lehman-bankruptcy 
-fees-top-1-billion/. 
 45. Peter J. Wallison, Everything You Wanted to Know About Credit De-
fault Swaps—but Were Never Told, AM. ENTER. INST., 1 (Dec. 2008), http:// 
www.aei.org/docLib/20090107_12DecFSOg.pdf. 
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C. AIG 
The AIG crisis presented regulators with a third opportu-
nity to choose between systemic risk and moral hazard. Follow-
ing the disastrous market reaction to the decision not to inter-
vene in Lehman, the regulatory choice was not a surprise. AIG 
was an enormous global insurance company (in fact the larg-
est), with a blue chip balance sheet (in 2005 it was one of only 
eight U.S. companies with a AAA bond rating).46 What made 
AIG integral to the global banking system was its derivatives 
business—originating CDSs on specific debt instruments, 
largely MBSs and structured products. When it collapsed, the 
notional value of AIG open derivatives contracts was $2.7 tril-
lion, with $1 trillion of it concentrated in twelve counterparties, 
all financial institutions.47 By purchasing a CDS, banks could 
avoid writing down—for regulatory capital calculations—the 
value of the security covered by the CDS.48 In 2008 alone, AIG 
had written more than $300 billion in CDSs for banks.49 If AIG 
failed, banks relying upon these CDSs would be forced to take 
enormous reductions in regulatory capital calculations.50  
At the direction of the Treasury and the Fed, the N.Y. Fed 
provided immediate relief through an $85 billion line of credit 
(called a Revolving Credit Facility (RCF)) and received in ex-
change 79.9 percent of the company.51 The deal was structured 
on the basis of a draft term sheet put together the previous day 
for a private-sector solution, which the private sector turned 
down.52 In response, the government made only one change in 
 
 46. JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 2, at 139. 
 47. Id. at 202. 
 48. The banking industry reliance on AIG to “insure” questionable CDO’s 
is evocative of Dickens’s definition of insurance: “[a] person who can’t pay, gets 
another person who can’t pay, to guarantee that he can pay.” Richard Fisher, 
Paradise Lost: Addressing Too Big to Fail, 30 CATO J. 323, 324 (2010) (quoting 
CHARLES DICKENS, LITTLE DORRIT 259 (London, Macmillan & Co. ed. 1895)). 
 49. SORKIN, supra note 1, at 395. 
 50. The Congressional Oversight Panel estimated that seven European 
banks received $16 billion in regulatory relief from AIG swap transactions. See 
CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, JUNE OVERSIGHT REPORT: THE AIG RESCUE, ITS 
IMPACT ON MARKETS, AND THE GOVERNMENT’S EXIT STRATEGY 92 fig.21 (2010) 
[hereinafter COP JUNE 2010 REPORT]. 
 51. FCIC STAFF REPORT, supra note 14, at 26. 
 52. The SIGTARP audit, which was issued on November 17, 2009, found, 
among other things, that the terms of the original N.Y. Fed financing did not 
result from independent analysis, but were simply an adoption of the term 
sheet from an aborted private financing discussion, and those terms, which 
included an onerous effective interest rate of eleven percent, made modifica-
tion of the terms and further government action inevitable. OFFICE OF THE 
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the terms. Instead of agreeing to a $75 billion RCF, it added 
$10 billion as a cushion.53  
This credit line was the beginning, not the end, of govern-
ment assistance to AIG. Subsequently, Treasury provided AIG 
with $40 billion from TARP funds under the Systemically Sig-
nificant Financial Institutions program (SSFI).54 AIG was the 
only recipient of funds under SSFI.55 AIG used the $40 billion 
to partially pay down the N.Y. Fed RCF,56 which was lowered 
from $85 billion to $60 billion.57 TARP also created an equity 
capital facility that AIG could access for up to $29.8 billion.58 
This was not the end of government assistance. The N.Y. Fed 
provided additional financial assistance through the creation of 
Maiden Lane II and III, perhaps the most interesting part of 
the AIG story.  
The N.Y. Fed created Maiden Lane II (ML II), a SPV, and 
loaned it $22.5 billion to purchase deeply discounted residential 
MBSs from AIG, which then used the cash to close out its se-
curities lending facility’s open positions.59 AIG thereby reduced 
its balance sheet, gained some liquidity, and reacquired the 
lent securities to bolster the balance sheets of its insurance 
subsidiaries.60 Since ML II received these securities at a deep 
discount, they were likely full collateral for the loaned funds.61  
Next, the N.Y. Fed created Maiden Lane III (ML III) and 
loaned it $30 billion to deal with AIG’s open CDSs.62 In addi-
tion to the collateral already held by the counterparties, ML III 
 
SPECIAL INSPECTOR GEN. FOR THE TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM, SIG-
QR-10-01, QUARTERLY REPORT TO CONGRESS 9 (2010) [hereinafter SIGTARP 
QUARTERLY REPORT, January 2010], available at http://www.sigtarp.gov/ 
reports/congress/2010/January2010_Quarterly_Report_to_Congress.pdf. 
 53. Id. 
 54. See SIGTARP QUARTERLY REPORT, July 2009, supra note 25, at 60. 
 55. Id. 
 56. See id.  
 57. See id. at 148 (“The $40 billion [of TARP money injected into AIG 
through the SSFI program] took some of the pressure off the first Federal Re-
serve line of credit, allowing ‘the Federal Reserve to reduce from $85 billion to 
$60 billion the total amount available under the credit facility.’” (quoting BD. 
OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., MONETARY POLICY REPORT TO 
CONGRESS 51 (2009), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/ 
files/20090224_mprfullreport.pdf )). 
 58. Id. at 60. 
 59. COP JUNE 2010 REPORT, supra note 50, at 71. 
 60. Id. 
 61. See id. 
 62. Id. at 74. 
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agreed to pay the full market value of the open CDSs.63 The net 
effect was to give those counterparties the full notional value of 
their securities.64 The COP and SIGTARP both concluded that 
the ML III deal grossly overpaid the CDS holders by an esti-
mated $78 billion.65 “Treasury had received back about 66 cents 
worth of obligations for each dollar it paid.”66 
ML II and ML III did not signal the end of government as-
sistance to AIG. In 2009 the N.Y. Fed received $25 billion of 
preferred equity interests from AIG in two SPVs formed to hold 
two of AIG’s largest foreign life insurance subsidiaries, AIA 
Group Ltd. and ALICO, and the RCF was lowered by $25 bil-
lion to $35 billion.67 The purpose of the exchange was to enable 
AIG to sell the two foreign subsidiaries.68 In November 2010 
AIG conducted an initial public offering (IPO) of AIA Group 
Ltd. stock in Hong Kong, raising $20.5 billion.69 At the same 
time, AIG sold ALICO to MetLife for MetLife stock and cash to-
taling $16.2 billion.70 In order to complete these transactions, 
AIG borrowed $22 billion from TARP to repurchase the N.Y. 
Fed’s preferred equity interests in the two SPV’s that held 
these subsidiaries.71 AIG also agreed to use the proceeds of the 
IPO and ALICO sale to pay down the existing N.Y. Fed loan.72 
AIG will also transfer the shares it retained in AIA Group Ltd. 
 
 63. Id. at 75. 
 64. See id. at 71 (“The differences between ML2 and ML3 must be empha-
sized. ML2 purchased deeply discounted securities from AIG, which was then 
able to use the proceeds of those sales to close out related obligations. In con-
trast, in ML3 . . . the SPV purchased securities from AIG’s counterparties in 
transactions, the net effect of which was to give those counterparties the full 
notional value of their securities.”).  
 65. TARP Oversight: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and In-
vestigations of the H. Fin. Servs. Comm., 111th Cong. 3 (2009) (testimony of 
Elizabeth Warren, Chair, Cong. Oversight Panel) [hereinafter Warren Testi-
mony], available at http://financialservices.house.gov/media/file/hearings/111/ 
testimony_of_elizabeth_warren022409.pdf. 
 66. Id. 
 67. COP JUNE 2010 REPORT, supra note 50, at 71. 
 68. See SIGTARP QUARTERLY REPORT, July 2009, supra note 25, at 60–61 
(“Two of AIG’s largest foreign life insurance businesses . . . have been put into 
special purpose vehicles (‘SPVs’) with significant preferred stock interests in 
those SPVs used to pay down the Federal Reserve Revolving Credit Facility.”). 
 69. David Lawder, AIG to Get $22 Billion in TARP Funds for Fed Exit, 
REUTERS, Nov. 1, 2010, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE 
6A03EK20101102. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
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and the MetLife shares it received in the ALICO sale to the 
Treasury.73 
As of June 30, 2010, AIG had not repaid any TARP funds, 
and had elected not to pay $5.5 billion in scheduled dividends.74 
AIG’s total government assistance was $181 billion, with more 
than $127 billion outstanding as of September 1, 2010.75 
The AIG bailout was, of course, a response to the systemic 
risk fear.76 After the market panic in response to Lehman, this 
was understandable. But the true beneficiaries were not AIG, 
its shareholders, or its insurance policyholders. AIG’s share-
holders were largely wiped out. Its policyholders were already 
protected by state insurance funds.77 
The real beneficiaries of the government’s actions were 
AIG creditors and counterparties to open AIG positions. The 
list of counterparties and the corresponding amount of govern-
ment funds they received, which the Fed originally refused to 
disclose,78 is illuminating:79 
 
Goldman Sachs: $12.9 billion  
Société Générale: $11.9 billion80  
 
 73. See id. (reporting the details of these transactions).  
 74. See CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, SEPTEMBER OVERSIGHT REPORT: 
ASSESSING THE TARP ON THE EVE OF ITS EXPIRATION 25 fig.2 (2010) [here-
inafter COP SEPTEMBER 2010 REPORT]. 
 75. See id. 
 76. See SORKIN, supra note 1, at 394–95 (describing the hectic and pan-
icked communications among Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke, Treasury Secre-
tary Henry Paulson, and N.Y. Fed President Tim Geithner—and others—at 
the time of AIG’s bailout). 
 77. But cf. COP JUNE 2010 REPORT, supra note 50, at 87 & n.408 (noting 
that because of the magnitude of AIG, it is possible that some state insurance 
guaranty funds may not have been able to pay off all insurance claims (citing 
Eric Dinallo, Op-Ed., What I Learned at the AIG Meltdown: State Insurance 
Regulation Wasn’t the Problem, WALL ST. J., Feb. 2, 2010, at A17)). 
 78. The Federal Bailout of AIG: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Over-
sight and Gov’t Reform, 111th Cong. 11 (2010) (statement of Neil Barofsky, 
Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program) [hereinafter 
Barofsky statement], available at http://oversight.house.gov/images/stories/ 
Hearings/pdfs/20100127barofsky.pdf (“Federal Reserve officials initially re-
fused to disclose the identities of the counterparties or the details of the pay-
ments, warning that disclosure of the names would undermine AIG’s stability, 
the privacy and business interests of the counterparties, and the stability of 
the markets.”). 
 79. See COP JUNE 2010 REPORT, supra note 50, at 94–95. 
 80. The New York Times reported that Goldman Sachs also received a 
significant amount of the money paid to Société Générale and possibly Calyon, 
which apparently bought CDS from AIG on behalf of Goldman. Gretchen Mor-
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Deutsche Bank:  $11.8 billion  
Barclays: $7.9 billion  
Merrill Lynch: $6.8 billion  
Bank of America: $5.2 billion  
UBS: $5.0 billion 
BNP Paribas:  $4.9 billion  
HSBC: $3.5 billion  
Calyon (Crédit Agricole): $2.4 billion 
 
These top ten AIG counterparties received $72.2 billion of 
government funds via ML III.81 It is noteworthy that all but 
Goldman Sachs, Merrill Lynch, and Bank of America are for-
eign banks. It is also noteworthy that in some cases, such as 
Goldman Sachs, more money was paid via ML III than was 
provided directly through the TARP capital purchase pro-
gram.82 After receiving $12.9 billion for its AIG open positions, 
Goldman reacquired the preferred stock it had issued to the 
government under TARP by repaying the $10 billion it received 
(plus $1.1 billion for the warrants).83 
II.  FOLLOWING THE MONEY   
The story of governmental assistance to financial institu-
tions and financial markets is complicated. It involved many 
government agencies, and many discrete programs and strate-
gies. It involved capital infusions into individual banks, guar-
antees against loss to support specific securities as well as 
pools of securities, the purchase of pools of securities, and the 
purchase of securities in the secondary market. Section A de-
scribes the efforts using funds appropriated by Congress in 
TARP. Section B describes the larger, more complex, and less 
transparent efforts undertaken by the government outside of 
the TARP program.  
 
genson & Louise Story, Testy Conflict with Goldman Helped Push A.I.G. to 
Precipice, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2010, at A1, available at 2010 WLNR 2580032.  
 81. See COP JUNE 2010 REPORT, supra note 50, at 94. 
 82. Goldman received $10 billion in TARP funds. SIGTARP QUARTERLY 
REPORT, July 2009, supra note 25, at 45 fig.2.5. 
 83. See ROBERT POZEN, TOO BIG TO SAVE? 79 fig.4.4, 383–84 (2010); Ste-
ven M. Davidoff, Chump Change from Goldman, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (July 
23, 2009, 12:21 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2009/07/23/chump-change 
-from-goldman/. 
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A. FOLLOWING THE TARP MONEY  
Congress authorized Treasury to use TARP in a manner 
that “protects home values, college funds, retirement accounts, 
and life savings; . . . preserves homeownership and promotes 
jobs and economic growth; . . . [and] maximizes overall returns 
to the taxpayers of the United States.”84 It appropriated $700 
billion in funding for TARP.85 In fact, TARP never spent this 
much. As of October 2010, Treasury had spent $388 billion and 
obligated to spend an additional $82 billion.86 Thirteen differ-
ent programs were announced during the life of TARP.87 Some 
were never implemented or implemented in only token ways.88 
A description of ten of the thirteen programs provides insight 
into the government’s response to the financial crisis.89  
The following six TARP programs invested capital or guar-
anteed assets in return for equity in financial institutions:  
1. The Capital Purchase Program (CPP) symbolized TARP 
for the general public. Treasury announced that CPP would di-
rectly invest in “healthy, viable banks to promote financial sta-
bility, maintain confidence in the financial system, and permit 
institutions to continue meeting the credit needs of American 
consumers and businesses.”90  
Over the life of the program Treasury purchased $205 bil-
lion in preferred stock and subordinated debentures from 707 
different qualifying financial institutions (QFIs) in forty-eight 
states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico.91 The ten 
largest investments accounted for $142.6 billion of the pro-
 
 84. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 
§ 2, 122 Stat. 3765, 3766. 
 85. OFFICE OF FIN. STABILITY, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, TROUBLED 
ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM: TWO YEAR RETROSPECTIVE 1 (2010) [hereinafter 
TREASURY RETROSPECTIVE REPORT], available at http://www.treasury.gov/press 
-center/news/Documents/TARP%20Two%20Year%20Retrospective_10%2005% 
2010_transmittal%20letter.pdf.  
 86. See SIGTARP QUARTERLY REPORT, October 2010, supra note 4, at 43. 
 87. SIGTARP QUARTERLY REPORT, July 2010, supra note 24, at 37. 
 88. See id. at 37–43. 
 89. Because the focus of this Article is the financial crisis, the TARP pro-
grams pertaining to the automobile industry will not be discussed in any detail.  
 90. OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GEN. FOR THE TROUBLED ASSET 
RELIEF PROGRAM, SIG-QR-09-04, QUARTERLY REPORT TO CONGRESS 55 (2009) 
[hereinafter SIGTARP QUARTERLY REPORT, October 2009], available at 
http://www.sigtarp.gov/reports/congress/2009/October2009_Quarterly_Report_to_ 
Congress.pdf. 
 91. SIGTARP QUARTERLY REPORT, July 2010, supra note 24, at 70. 
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gram.92 Three hundred thirty-one of the 707 recipients received 
$10 million or less.93 
Under CPP, Treasury received senior preferred shares that 
pay a five percent dividend for the first five years and nine per-
cent per year thereafter.94 In addition to the senior preferred 
shares, each public QFI issued Treasury ten-year warrants 
equal to approximately fifteen percent of the preferred stock 
investment (five percent for nonpublic QFIs).95 
As of September 30, 2010, 121 banks, including ten with 
the largest CPP investments, had paid back all or a portion of 
their principal or repurchased shares for an aggregate total of 
$152.8 billion of repayments.96 The government also had re-
ceived $8 billion as proceeds from the sale or repurchase of CPP 
and TIP warrants and an additional $3 billion in proceeds from 
the sale of Citigroup stock.97  
As of September 1, 2010, 614 banks retained their CPP 
funds, with $55.1 billion outstanding.98 At the end of that 
month, there was $211.3 million in outstanding unpaid CPP 
dividends.99 
2. The Capital Assistance Program built upon CPP. Follow-
ing the 2009 stress tests100 of the nineteen largest bank holding 
companies, Treasury offered these banks the option of request-
ing additional capital investment or conversion of CPP pre-
ferred into mandatory convertible preferred shares.101 
3. The Systemically Significant Failing Institutions (SSFI) 
program was created to assist QFIs requiring exceptional assis-
tance. AIG was the only recipient of funds under SSFI.102 
4. The Targeted Investment Program (TIP) provided special 
funding to Bank of America and Citigroup.103 It purchased $20 
 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 69. 
 95. Id. 
 96. SIGTARP QUARTERLY REPORT, October 2010, supra note 4, at 92–93. 
 97. TREASURY RETROSPECTIVE REPORT, supra note 85, at 23. 
 98. COP SEPTEMBER 2010 REPORT, supra note 74, at 22. 
 99. SIGTARP QUARTERLY REPORT, October 2010, supra note 4, at 13. 
 100. Stress tests are used by regulators to assess whether a bank has suffi-
cient capital to withstand an adverse change in economic conditions. For a 
more detailed discussion of the stress tests, see FCIC STAFF REPORT, supra 
note 14, at 32–34. 
 101. SIGTARP QUARTERLY REPORT, July 2009, supra note 25, at 53–55. 
 102. Id. at 32. 
 103. TREASURY RETROSPECTIVE REPORT, supra note 85, at 29. 
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billion of senior preferred stock and received warrants for 
common stock from each bank.104 Both banks have repurchased 
the stock.105  
5. The Asset Guarantee Program (AGP) was similar to the 
JPM/Bear loss insurance pool. The Treasury, Fed, and Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) agreed jointly to provide 
loss protection for a pool of Citigroup troubled assets worth 
$301 billion.106 In exchange, Citigroup issued $7 billion in 
trust-preferred securities and warrants to Treasury and the 
FDIC.107 At the end of 2009, the insurance protection was can-
celled and Treasury reduced its interest in the trust-preferred 
securities to $2.2 billion.108 
6. The Community Development Capital Initiative (CDCI) 
funded organizations providing financial services to under-
served communities.109 Eligible entities could obtain capital up 
to five percent of their risk-weighted assets.110 The preferred 
stock issued would pay an annual dividend of two percent for 
eight years, increasing to nine percent thereafter.111 Through 
CDCI, eighty-four institutions received a total of $570 mil-
lion.112  
Four other TARP programs focused on reviving the prima-
ry and secondary debt markets in asset-backed securities 
(ABS): 
1. The Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF) 
was designed to jumpstart the primary ABS market.113 The 
N.Y. Fed provided three- or five-year nonrecourse loans to in-
vestors secured by certain types of ABSs, including newly is-
sued and legacy commercial mortgage-backed securities 
(CMBS) and residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS).114 
Initially a $200 billion loan facility (backed by $20 billion from 
TARP), it was then expanded to up to $1 trillion of lending 
 
 104. Id. 
 105. See id. 
 106. Id. at 30. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 30–31. 
 109. SIGTARP QUARTERLY REPORT, July 2010, supra note 24, at 85. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. TREASURY RETROSPECTIVE REPORT, supra note 85, at 33. “Of this 
amount, approximately $363.3 million from 28 banks was exchanged from in-
vestments under the Capital Purchase Program into the CDCI.” Id.  
 113. See SIGTARP QUARTERLY REPORT, July 2010, supra note 24, at 91. 
 114. Id. at 92. 
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(backed by $80 billion from TARP).115 Ultimately, it supported 
thirteen nonmortgage ABS deals totaling $59 billion and an 
additional thirteen CMBS deals totaling $12.1 billion.116 Be-
cause of the dramatic collapse of these markets, these offerings 
accounted for twenty-five percent of the ABS market and sev-
enty-one percent of the CMBS market in 2009.117 The only 
TARP funds lost, approximately $1 million, went to adminis-
tration costs.118 In addition, the Congressional Budget Office 
(CBO) “estimated the subsidy rate for Treasury protection for 
the TALF to be 6 percent, resulting in a $1 billion loss in TARP 
funds over the life of the program.”119 
2. The Public-Private Investment Program (PPIP) was 
created to restart frozen credit markets through the purchase 
of legacy assets (e.g., legacy loans, CMBS, RMBS).120 Nine fund 
managers were selected, eight of which remained as of July 
2010.121 The Treasury, through TARP, agreed to make an equi-
ty investment equal to the private capital raised and then pro-
vide debt financing at LIBOR+1% equal to the total public-
private equity investment.122 As of July 2010 the eight funds 
had closed on a total of $22.1 billion (total allocated $30 billion) 
in debt and equity financing from TARP.123 Treasury has re-
ported rates of return for the eight funds ranging from nine to 
twenty-six percent.124 
3. The Unlocking Credit for Small Businesses (UCSB) pro-
gram was created to restart the secondary market in securities 
backed by Small Business Administration (SBA) loans.125 In-
itially, Treasury committed $15 billion in TARP funds (subse-
quently lowered to $1 billion and then lowered again to $400 
 
 115. SIGTARP QUARTERLY REPORT, July 2009, supra note 25, at 72. 
 116. SIGTARP QUARTERLY REPORT, October 2010, supra note 4, at 52. 
 117. COP SEPTEMBER 2010 REPORT, supra note 74, at 49. 
 118. See SIGTARP QUARTERLY REPORT, July 2010, supra note 24, at 96. 
 119. COP SEPTEMBER 2010 REPORT, supra note 74, at 23–24. 
 120. See SIGTARP QUARTERLY REPORT, July 2010, supra note 24, at 41. 
 121. See id.  
 122. See id. at 50 tbl.2.4, 100. The London interbank offering rate (LIBOR) 
is a commonly used lending benchmark based on the interest rate for bank-to-
bank short-term lending. 
 123. See COP SEPTEMBER 2010 REPORT, supra note 74, at 23 (noting that 
after the Dodd-Frank Act was enacted, Treasury reduced the $30 billion initial 
allocation of TARP funds to the PPIP to $22.4 billion).  
 124. Id. 
 125. See SIGTARP QUARTERLY REPORT, October 2010, supra note 4, at 141. 
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million in July 2010).126 Ultimately, Treasury made thirty-one 
purchases totaling $357 million.127 
4. The Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) was 
created to directly assist homeowners facing foreclosure by pro-
viding a method of renegotiating mortgages to affordable lev-
els.128 The original goal was to assist three to four million 
homeowners.129 During the great depression the Federal gov-
ernment created an analogous program, called the Home Own-
ers Loan Corporation (HOLC). “Although the HOLC refinanced 
approximately 20% of the nation’s mortgages, preventing many 
foreclosures, its success was qualified. The agency rejected half 
of the applications and set relatively stringent terms for bor-
rowers. Nevertheless, 20% of its loans ended in default.”130  
The July 2010 SIGTARP report was highly critical of the 
program:  
Despite a seemingly ever increasing array of HAMP-related initia-
tives designed to encourage participation in the program, the number 
of homeowners being helped through permanent modifications re-
mains anemic, with fewer than 400,000 ongoing permanent modifica-
tions (only approximately 165,000 of which are in connection with the 
TARP-funded portion of HAMP) . . . .131 
The report concluded that:  
The American people are essentially being asked to shoulder an addi-
tional $50 billion of national debt without being told, more than 16 
months after the program’s announcement, how many people Treas-
ury hopes to actually help stay in their homes as a result of these ex-
penditures, how many people are intended to be helped through other 
subprograms, and how the program is performing against those ex-
pectations and goals.132 
B. FOLLOWING THE REAL MONEY—NON-TARP FUNDING AND 
GUARANTEES 
While the public focused on the cost and impact of TARP, 
in reality it was only one component of the government re-
sponse to the financial crisis. When compared to other govern-
 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. See SIGTARP QUARTERLY REPORT, July 2010, supra note 24, at 54. 
 129. See id. at 56. 
 130. Learning from the Past: Lessons from The Banking Crises of the 20th 
Century: Hearing Before the Cong. Oversight Panel, 111th Cong. 84 (2009) 
(statement of Eugene N. White, Professor of Economics, Rutgers University), 
available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=111_ 
senate_hearings&docid=f:48951.pdf. 
 131. SIGTARP QUARTERLY REPORT, July 2010, supra note 24, at 6. 
 132. Id. at 7. 
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ment loan guarantee programs and secondary market interven-
tions, it was a small piece of a very large pie. The July 2010 
SIGTARP report calculated the current outstanding balance of 
overall federal support for the nation’s financial system at $3.7 
trillion in actual expenditures and guarantees.133 Most of the 
amount was assumed or spent without direct congressional ac-
tion.134 Several agencies participated in the non-TARP bailout. 
The following are the most significant of the agencies that par-
ticipated: 
1. The Federal Reserve Board established eighteen financial 
support programs outside of TARP since 2007.135 Some pro-
grams provided short-term liquidity to banks and other finan-
cial institutions through secured transactions.136 Other pro-
grams provided liquidity to support the commercial paper 
market, the money markets (and funds), and the ABS mar-
kets.137 The Fed also engaged in massive open market purchas-
es to support all credit markets.138 The Fed authorized a maxi-
mum potential balance sheet expansion of approximately $6.7 
trillion and, at its peak in May 2010, its balance sheet had 
reached $2.4 trillion.139 As of July 2010 its balance sheet was 
approximately $1.7 trillion, including $1.1 trillion in govern-
ment sponsored entities (GSE) debt.140  
The magnitude of Fed lending to financial institutions has 
recently been made public, as mandated by the Dodd-Frank 
Act.141 At its peak, the Fed lent $3.3 trillion to QFIs at interest 
rates ranging from 0.5 percent to 3.25 percent.142  
2. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) simi-
larly authorized a potential balance sheet expansion up to $2.5 
trillion.143 As of July 2010 its assets stood at $309.6 billion.144  
 
 133. Id. at 5. 
 134. See id. 
 135. Id. at 120. 
 136. See id. 
 137. See id. at 120–21. 
 138. See id. at 121. 
 139. Id. at 118. 
 140. See id. at 122 tbl.3.2. 
 141. See Gretchen Morgenson, So That’s Where the Money Went, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 4, 2010, at BU1, available at 2010 WLNR 24107629 (“The Dodd-
Frank law forced the Fed to disclose the recipients of $3.3 trillion from emer-
gency lending programs put in place during the crisis days of 2008, so the tax-
payers who paid for those rescue efforts now know whom they were helping.”).  
 142. See id. 
 143. See SIGTARP QUARTERLY REPORT, July 2010, supra note 24, at 118. 
 144. See id. at 119, 141 tbl.3.4. 
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3. The Federal Housing Finance Administration (FHFA) 
had an implied commitment obligation of approximately $6 tril-
lion for all outstanding GSE debt and MBS guarantees.145  
4. The Department of Housing and Urban Development 
(HUD) made approximately $500 billion in additional guaran-
tees from Federal Housing Administration and Government 
National Mortgage Administration obligations over its pre-
crisis commitments.146  
5. The Department of Education purchased $99.6 billion in 
educational student loans, as of June 30, 2010.147 
6. The Department of the Treasury had an outstanding bal-
ance for non-TARP programs that increased from $257.1 billion 
to $533.5 billion between July 2009 and July 2010.148 As of 
June 30, 2010, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac had received 
$83.6 billion and $61.3 billion, respectively, and the Treasury 
held $180.7 billion in GSE MBS.149 Also, Treasury purchased 
$15.3 billion in newly issued Fannie and Freddie debt obliga-
tions.150 
In 2009 the SIGTARP testified that if all government ef-
forts, including guarantees, were included, the theoretical gov-
ernment risk exposure would be an astounding $23.7 trillion,151 
which is equal to roughly 150 percent of U.S. GDP.152 In his Ju-
ly 2010 report, he revised this figure upward to $23.9 trillion.153 
Fortunately, this doomsday scenario did not, and will not, oc-
 
 145. Id. at 119. 
 146. Id.  
 147. Id. at 140. 
 148. Id. at 119. 
 149. Id. at 137–38. 
 150. See id. at 136 tbl.3.3. 
 151. See Following the Money: Report of the Special Inspector General for 
the Troubled Asset Relief Program [SIGTARP]: Hearing Before the H. Comm. 
on Oversight and Gov’t Reform, 111th Cong. 15 (2009) (statement of Neil Ba-
rofsky, Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program), 
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111hhrg62118/pdf/CHRG 
-111hhrg62118.pdf. 
 152. See News Release: Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and Corporate Prof-
its, BUREAU ECON. ANALYSIS, http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/ 
gdpnewsrelease.htm (last modified Mar. 25, 2011). 
 153. See SIGTARP QUARTERLY REPORT, July 2010, supra note 24, at 116 
(“[The m]aximum potential commitment related to crisis ($23.9 trillion)—each 
program’s gross, not net, pledged commitment if all eligible applicants had re-
quested the maximum assistance for each program at the same time. Implicit 
guarantees are included in these figures. When a program has no limit, such 
as Treasury’s commitment to backstop losses for the GSEs, the high-water 
mark is used for this figure as well.”). 
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cur. However, in the same report he indicated that the actual 
high-water mark for government assistance and guarantees 
was $6.3 trillion.154  
C. ASSESSING TARP AND NON-TARP INTERVENTIONS 
Assessing TARP and non-TARP assistance is difficult. 
While many of the TARP programs have largely ended, some 
such as PPIP and HAMP will continue on for years to come. In 
some cases, particularly the non-TARP initiatives, too little is 
still known. Not only is the size of many non-TARP efforts non-
public, but also the final cost will not be ascertainable until the 
securities purchased or guaranteed are sold. With these ca-
veats, section 1 will examine the extent that TARP addressed 
the goals of Congress included in the act. Section 2 will ex-
amine the costs, as they are known to date, of TARP programs. 
Section 3 will look at the AIG intervention and discuss three 
important problems in the implementation of this pre-TARP in-
tervention. 
1. Did TARP Accomplish Its Goals? 
“TARP was an essential piece of a necessary evil—that is, it 
saved the American financial system from collapse—but it was 
implemented in a way that was excessively favorable to the very 
bankers who had presided over the collapse. And this sets up 
exactly the wrong incentives as we head into the next credit 
cycle.”  
—Simon Johnson, Professor of Global Economics and 
Management, MIT Sloan School of Management.155 
 
With the benefit of hindsight, one must conclude that 
TARP was far less significant than envisioned. Both the 
SIGTARP and the COP have questioned whether TARP had a 
tangible impact on its nonbailout goals—stimulating the broad 
economy and job growth, stemming the tidal wave of home fore-
closures, protecting pensions and savings, and maximizing re-
turns to investors.156 As discussed below in section 2, TARP 
 
 154. Id. 
 155. Simon Johnson, TARP, the Long Goodbye, N.Y. TIMES ECONOMIX 
(Sept. 30, 2010, 6:00 AM), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/09/30/tarp 
-the-long-goodbye/. 
 156. See COP SEPTEMBER 2010 REPORT, supra note 74, at 88 (noting that 
since the enactment of EESA, home values have fallen, foreclosures have in-
creased, and investments for college and retirement have yet to recover their 
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never came close to spending the full $700 billion that Congress 
originally appropriated. In fact it now seems clear that the 
open market activities of the Fed and the expanded guarantee 
programs of the Fed, FDIC, HUD, and FHFA likely had a big-
ger impact. 
While it did not achieve the lofty national goals stated, it 
was foolish to think that it would. TARP was an emergency 
program to halt a financial panic before it became a complete 
financial collapse. In that respect, TARP and the larger non-
TARP interventions worked. Our banking system is not com-
pletely sound. But it is also not on life support. Whether it is 
more susceptible to larger financial crises in the future will be 
discussed in Part III. 
2. What Did TARP Cost the Government? 
TARP did not cost the taxpayer as much as was feared. 
The full $700 billion appropriated by Congress was never 
spent. In fact, total spending under TARP was less than $400 
billion and over $200 billion has been repaid, with interest and 
in some cases a profit on the warrants issued.157 Currently, the 
overall annual rate of return stands at 9.9 percent.158 In No-
vember 2010, the General Motors (GM) IPO further reduced 
the total cost of TARP.159 Similarly, the government announced 
that its sale of its remaining Citigroup stock would result in a 
total government profit of $12 billion on funds provided to Citi-
group.160 Eventually more will be repaid from the sale of the 
 
value); SIGTARP QUARTERLY REPORT, October 2010, supra note 4, at 5–6 
(noting that TARP has failed to increase lending, reduce unemployment, or 
encourage modification of more than a fraction of home mortgages). 
 157. See TREASURY RETROSPECTIVE REPORT, supra note 85, at i, 14. As of 
September 30, 2010, the government has earned $8.2 billion from the sale of 
warrants received from banks under TARP. Id. at 13 fig.3-A. 
 158. See COP SEPTEMBER 2010 REPORT, supra note 74, at 22 (“For CPP in-
vestments in financial institutions that have been fully repaid, including war-
rants repurchased or sold, the overall annual rate of return currently stands 
at 9.9 percent.”). 
 159. In the GM IPO, the government sold 411 million shares (reducing its 
ownership from sixty-one percent to thirty-three percent) and received $13.5 
billion. Chris V. Nicholson, Treasury Nets Further $1.8 Billion from G.M. 
I.P.O., N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Dec. 3, 2010, 4:11 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes 
.com/2010/12/03/treasury-nets-further-1-8-billion-from-g-m-i-p-o/. “The auto-
maker will buy back $2.1 billion in preferred stock from Treasury this month, 
at which point the government will have recovered $23.1 billion in payments, 
interest and dividends on its $49.5 billion rescue, it said.” Id. 
 160. Eric Dash, Treasury to Sell Last of Its Stake in Citigroup, N.Y. TIMES 
DEALBOOK (Dec. 6, 2010, 5:07 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/12/06/ 
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remainder of the government interest in GM,161 from the sale of 
remaining AIG assets, and the eventual sale of AIG stock held 
by the government. 
In its September 2010 report, the COP found that 614 
banks still held their CPP funds, with a total of $55.1 billion 
outstanding.162 “As a result, it is not yet possible to calculate 
precisely the amount of money that the CPP will earn or lose, 
although any losses can be capped at $57.4 billion.”163 The di-
rect financial cost to the federal government, however, will 
probably be a fraction of that exposure, and the CPP program 
may even produce a net gain.164  
The performance of the original JPM/Bear troubled assets 
pool, the Citigroup troubled assets pool, and the aforemen-
tioned PPIP pools all suggest that the government guarantee 
program on these pools, when executed properly, was also suc-
cessful. This suggests that the government will make a profit 
on the PPIP pools. 
The September 2010 COP report summarized TARP losses 
in each program, as estimated by the Office of Management 
and Budget (OMB), CBO, and Treasury.165 In each case, there 
was agreement that the large losses for TARP will likely come 
from the auto bailout, HAMP, and AIG.166 Although the HAMP 
program could potentially cost $20 billion to $50 billion, if the 
program continues to flounder it may not cost much.167 The au-
to bailout must be viewed separately from TARP. It may or 
may not cost $25 billion to $34 billion.168 While the GM IPO 
suggests a lower figure, it may be years before we know. 
While the AIG intervention is still likely to lose $35 billion 
to $50 billion, Treasury officials dispute this figure and believe 
that the government commitment will ultimately be profita-
 
treasury-to-sell-last-of-citi-stake/. 
 161. Michael J. de la Merced & Bill Vlasic, U.S. Recovers Billions in Sale of 
G.M. Stock, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2010, at A1, available at 2010 WLNR 
22969625 (“To break even, the Treasury Department will need to sell its re-
maining 500 million shares at an average price of $53 each in the months and 
years to come.”). 
 162. COP SEPTEMBER 2010 REPORT, supra note 74, at 22. 
 163. Id.  
 164. Id. at 108–09 (“The CBO also estimates that the financial institution 
bailout component of TARP—the Capital Purchase Program (CPP)—will re-
turn a profit of approximately $2 billion.”). 
 165. See id. at 20 fig.1. 
 166. See id. 
 167. See supra text accompanying notes 131–32. 
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ble.169 However, one must recognize that much of the total cost 
of the AIG intervention could have been avoided, or reduced, if 
government officials had acted prudently (in negotiating the 
original terms of the AIG loan and in monitoring AIG bonuses), 
had insisted on shared sacrifice from CDS counterparties in its 
negotiations, and had not used AIG as a disguised funding con-
duit to other institutions.170 
Finally, in determining the true cost of TARP, one must 
consider a variety of “hidden” costs. For example, an earlier 
SIGTARP report identified another TARP cost that has been 
overlooked.171 Because all of the money allocated to TARP had 
to be borrowed by the U.S. government, one must include the 
borrowing cost of these funds into the total cost of the TARP 
program.172 As of September 30, 2009, Treasury estimates that 
the dollar-weighted average cost of TARP funding was below 
0.9 percent for a total interest cost of $2.3 billion.173 The 
SIGTARP disputed this figure. Using an average blended cost 
of Treasury funds, it determined the borrowing cost as at least 
twice this amount, and an “all-in” estimate (carrying costs over 
the life of the borrowings) would yield an amount three to four 
times the $2.3 billion estimate.174 
In its September 2010 report, the COP noted that in June 
2009 the CBO estimated that TARP would cost $159 billion, 
and in August 2009 the OMB projected that TARP would cost 
$341 billion.175 In its FY 2011 budget estimate, OMB lowered 
its projections to $116.8 billion and the CBO estimate was low-
ered to $109 billion and then to $66 billion.176 In its retrospec-
tive report, the Treasury has projected a final TARP cost of $51 
billion (including the auto bailout).177 With the success of the 
GM IPO, the sale of AIG foreign subsidiaries, a future AIG gov-
ernment stock sale, and if the HAMP program continues to be 
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unsuccessful, it is conceivable that the final cost to the taxpay-
er will be close to zero. 
The true costs of the secondary-market interventions and 
guarantees provided by the Fed and other agencies cannot be 
predicted at this time. In fact, it may be years before even a 
rough calculation is possible. Only the Fed knows the quality of 
the securities it bought and the guarantees it provided.178 Since 
the prices paid by the Fed were intentionally designed to pro-
vide market stability, one should assume that the prices were 
higher than the prevailing market prices, but below the intrin-
sic value of the securities in a recovering market. Whether the 
long-term prices will be higher is unknowable. 
3. What Went Wrong? 
Any analysis of the AIG bailout should not begin with a 
judgment on the choice between addressing moral-hazard risk 
or systemic risk. The market panic and collapse following Leh-
man made it imperative that the government intervene. In-
stead, the focus should be on the mechanics of the intervention 
and how to minimize the cost and consequences of it. The fol-
lowing three sections describe mistakes that were made in AIG, 
namely (a) the myth of the binary choice, (b) the government’s 
failure to negotiate effectively or choice not to negotiate, and (c) 
the high costs of backdoor bailouts. 
a. Myth of the Binary Choice  
On any number of occasions, Chairman Bernanke, Secre-
tary Paulson, and Secretary Geithner have stated that the de-
cision on AIG was a binary choice—a full government bailout or 
a full collapse that would have resulted in a cataclysmic sys-
temic failure.179 This Article disagrees with that position and 
posits that the history of recent financial failures demonstrates 
that this was not a binary choice. In many prior financial fail-
ures (for example, Salomon Brothers, Long-Term Capital Man-
agement, Bear Stearns, Washington Mutual, and Wachovia), 
the government obtained private-sector participation. While of-
ficials consistently argue that no private-sector alternative was 
possible, it is hard to fathom why. For example, it was possible 
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for regulators to persuade the private sector to participate in 
the Long-Term Capital Management bailout,180 but not in a 
resolution of AIG, a company with a demonstrably robust or-
ganic business! One must speculate whether no private option 
for AIG existed because all private suitors understood that the 
government would take action. The COP rejected the binary-
choice rationale: 
The government argues that AIG’s failure would have resulted in 
chaos, so that a wholesale rescue was the only viable choice. The Pan-
el rejects this all-or-nothing reasoning. The government had addition-
al options at its disposal leading into the crisis, although those op-
tions narrowed sharply in the final hours before it committed $85 
billion in taxpayer dollars.181  
The COP report acknowledges the difficulty in obtaining a 
private-sector solution in the short time available and given the 
state of panic in the markets.182 However, it identifies two im-
portant benefits of a private resolution:  
First, it would have saved billions of taxpayer dollars and mitigated if 
not eliminated the serious moral hazard and “too big to fail” concerns. 
Second, a successful private sector rescue would have served as a very 
strong and calming signal that the U.S. financial system was strong 
enough to function without a full government bailout. The Panel also 
notes that had private parties been involved they—and not the gov-
ernment—could have managed much of the post-bailout reorganiza-
tion of the company.183 
b. The Government Failed to Negotiate Effectively or Chose Not 
to Negotiate  
In the JPM/Bear acquisition, the government actively ne-
gotiated and insisted on a low share purchase price to send a 
message.184 In the GM and Chrysler bailouts, government ne-
gotiators worked for weeks to obtain concessions from creditors, 
investors, auto suppliers, and auto dealers.185 In contrast, the 
entire AIG program was literally constructed overnight by ex-
hausted government officials who panicked after the market 
reaction to Lehman. It accepted an AIG proposal that the pri-
 
 180. See FCIC STAFF REPORT, supra note 14, at 20 (noting that Long-Term 
Capital Management was a massive, high-profile hedge fund that became in-
solvent in 1998 due to losses of more than $4 billion). 
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vate sector rejected, and further agreed to provide AIG with an 
additional $10 billion.186 
It refused to insist upon shared sacrifice by unsecured 
creditors and, in fact, through ML III, it agreed to pay $1.00 for 
$0.66 of securities,187 expressly deciding not to negotiate a bet-
ter deal or use its leverage as regulator to demand conces-
sions.188 As the COP concluded:  
The rescue of AIG distorted the marketplace by transforming highly 
risky derivative bets into fully guaranteed payment obligations. In 
the ordinary course of business, the costs of AIG’s inability to meet its 
derivative obligations would have been borne entirely by AIG’s share-
holders and creditors under the well-established rules of bankruptcy. 
But . . . the government instead shifted those costs in full onto tax-
payers . . . . [T]he government backed up the entire derivatives mar-
ket, as if these trades deserved the same taxpayer backstop as sav-
ings deposits and checking accounts.189 
SIGTARP Barofsky testified before Congress that “Federal 
Reserve officials provided AIG’s counterparties with tens of bil-
lions of dollars they likely would have not otherwise received 
had AIG gone into bankruptcy.”190 
The government’s disinterest in negotiating in the best in-
terests of the taxpayer did not end with ML III. Subsequently, 
the government permitted AIG to pay $168 million in compen-
sation bonuses and tried to hide the fact.191 While it was argued 
that these bonuses were contractual obligations, one should 
remember that the contracts would have been subject to rene-
gotiation in bankruptcy.192 
c. High Costs of Backdoor Bailouts 
There is a widespread perception that the decision to bail-
out AIG without demanding concessions was designed to save 
its counterparties, such as Goldman Sachs.193 While this per-
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March 2009 AIGFP payments until February 28, 2009.”).  
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ception may never be confirmed, it is interesting that Goldman 
received more money through ML III, $12.9 billion,194 than it 
received through the TARP CPP program, $10 billion.195 Short-
ly after receiving the money via ML III, the firm repaid its CPP 
loan.196 In doing so, it escaped the TARP restrictions on com-
pensation. 
Similarly, COP pointed out that the government conserva-
torship of the GSEs Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (estimated to 
cost $389 billion) provided another backdoor subsidy, possibly 
as much as $100 billion, to financial institutions.197  
III.  WAS THIS CRISIS—OR THE GOVERNMENT’S 
RESPONSE—REALLY DIFFERENT?   
The financial crisis and the government’s response must be 
examined in the context of past financial crises. Section A of 
this Part will briefly describe six discrete financial failures that 
occurred during the past four decades and highlight a remark-
ably consistent pattern both in the banking failures and in 
their governmental responses. Section B will discuss how the 
business model of banking has changed while the regulatory 
oversight model has failed to keep pace with these changes. 
The significant and steady trend of consolidation in the finan-
cial sector will also be discussed. Finally, section C will consid-
er what can be learned from this and past financial crises, what 
to expect when future crises inevitably occur, and several regu-
latory changes that have been adopted or should be considered.  
A. PAST BANKING FAILURES 
The Federal Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC) staff issued 
a study of bank failures and government interventions.198 A 
short review of several notable examples reveals a familiar and 
recurring pattern. 
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1. Franklin National Bank failed in 1974. An obscure bank 
on Long Island, New York, it tripled in size in eleven years.199 
It financed its aggressive lending, largely in commercial real 
estate and mysterious foreign loans, by aggressively seeking 
wholesale deposits, often from foreign depositors, at above-
market interest rates.200 These loans were not federally in-
sured. When it experienced a sudden series of loan failures, 
large amounts of the wholesale deposits were withdrawn, caus-
ing it to fail. When the bank failed, the FDIC covered all unin-
sured depositors and creditors.201 At the time it was the largest 
U.S. bank bailout since the Great Depression.202 
2. First Pennsylvania Bank failed in 1980. One of the oldest 
and largest banks in the state, it pursued an aggressive lending 
strategy for a decade.203 The bank quadrupled in size in thir-
teen years, fueled by uninsured wholesale deposits.204 Because 
Pennsylvania banking law prohibited an out-of-state bank from 
acquiring it, and no geographically proximate in-state bank 
was large enough, the FDIC provided a $325 million interest-
free loan (and received warrants for a majority of bank stock) 
and assumed control until the bank could be liquidated.205 
3. Continental Illinois Bank failed in 1984. Once again, a 
bank pursued a high-growth strategy of high-risk lending in 
energy, real estate, and foreign sovereign debt (doubling in size 
in five years), fueled by uninsured wholesale deposits and 
short-term borrowing.206 At the time of failure, $27 billion out 
of $30 billion in deposits were uninsured.207 When the bank 
failed, no merger partner was available because of state-law 
prohibitions on branch banking. In exchange for stock and war-
rants representing an eighty percent interest in the company, 
the FDIC provided $4.5 billion and covered all uninsured de-
positors and creditors.208 The phrase “too big to fail” was used 
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for the first time at congressional hearings on Continental Illi-
nois.209 
4. The Bank of New England failed in 1991. Once again, 
this bank doubled in size in four years, primarily through lend-
ing in the commercial real estate and construction market.210 
When the bank failed, the FDIC covered all bank creditors, but 
did not cover holding company bondholders or affiliated 
banks.211 The resolution costs totaled $733 million.212 
5. The national banking crisis of the 1980s. During the pe-
riod from 1980 to 1994, more than 1600 banks failed at a cost of 
$36 billion to the FDIC, and more than 1300 savings and loan 
banks failed, costing the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance 
Corporation (FSLIC) $28 billion and taxpayers $132 billion.213  
6. The Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers failures in 2008 
followed the same pattern. Bear Stearns’s assets grew from 
$185 billion to $400 billion during the years 2003 to 2008.214 
Similarly, Lehman’s assets grew from $354 billion to $814 bil-
lion during the years 2003 to 2007.215 Both firms fueled this 
growth through short-term borrowing, largely in the repo mar-
ket.  
This brief summary of past financial failures demonstrates 
a recurring pattern of events. A financial institution dramati-
cally increases its lending capacity by obtaining high-cost 
wholesale demand deposits or short-term borrowing from other 
financial institutions (such as the overnight repo market). 
These short-term funds are used to finance a business strategy 
focused on longer-term, high-risk lending. When a portion of 
these loans default, due to poor lending practices or the col-
lapse of a market bubble, the wholesale deposits are with-
drawn, the short-term lenders refuse to continue lending, and 
the bank becomes insolvent. Inevitably, the financial regulator 
must intervene. If possible, the regulator orchestrates a pri-
vate-sector takeover of the failed institution, frequently involv-
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ing federal assumption of troubled assets. In each of these re-
spects, the crisis of 2008 was no different. 
B. WHILE THE CRISIS WAS NOT DIFFERENT, THE BUSINESS OF 
BANKING IS 
Notwithstanding the repetitive pattern in financial crises, 
the business model of banking has changed during the last 
three decades. Section 1 will describe the most significant 
changes arising from a combination of financial innovation, 
such as securitization, and deregulatory actions designed to 
permit banks to engage in a wider array of business sectors. It 
will also describe how the traditional model of banking regula-
tion did not change sufficiently to keep pace with the banks 
under regulation. Section 2 will briefly describe the substantial 
consolidation in the banking industry that occurred during this 
same period of time.  
1. The Banking Business Model Changed Fundamentally in 
Three Decades, but the Model for Regulatory Oversight Did 
Not Keep Pace 
In response to the stock market crash of 1929 and the en-
suing Great Depression, Congress enacted the Banking Act of 
1933 (commonly referred to as Glass-Steagall after its two 
principal sponsors).216 The law dramatically reformed the 
structure of banking in the United States and created a nation-
al system of regulation. For the first time, the government pro-
vided a safety net for the general public when it established a 
national government insurance program for all bank depos-
its.217 In doing so, it acted as a prudent insurer. Glass-Steagall 
limited the amount of insurance available on each account, it 
empowered the Fed to set limits on the interest rate that banks 
could pay on insured bank deposits, and, most importantly, it 
limited what banks could do with these insured funds.218 Glass-
Steagall required commercial banks to eliminate or sell off in-
vestment banking and brokerage divisions.219 This prevented 
banks from using government-insured deposits to engage in 
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high-risk business (other than risky loans).220 Notwithstanding 
limited failures, this model worked.221 In this highly regulated 
system, banks were the dominant provider of lending interme-
diation.222 By regulating the maximum interest rate on savings 
accounts, it created a business model for banks that virtually 
guaranteed profitability.223 It also created a system in which 
bank (including savings and loan banks) failures were rare.224 
This business model no longer exists. It began to crumble 
in 1980 when the combination of high inflation and competition 
from money market funds (which could pay much higher mar-
ket rates) caused the Fed to rescind Regulation Q, which set 
savings account interest rates.225 The growth of money market 
funds, which invested in short-term government debt and pri-
vate commercial paper, created a huge demand for corporate 
commercial paper.226 Companies could access this market for 
short-term operating cash, instead of relying upon banks to 
provide revolving lines of credit.227 SEC regulation 415 (shelf 
regulation), in 1984, reduced the time required for, and cost of, 
corporate debt offerings and siphoned off longer-term bank 
lending to companies.228 The use of junk bonds to finance mer-
gers and acquisitions and to finance long-term borrowing by 
noninvestment grade companies diminished another profitable 
banking segment.229 The enormous growth in asset-backed se-
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curitization—first residential mortgages, followed by commer-
cial mortgages, followed by car and consumer loans, followed by 
credit card receivables—changed banks from the ultimate lend-
er, with the risk of loan default, into an intermediary who de-
rived profits from loan origination fees, securitization-
underwriting fees, and loan-servicing fees. In the “originate to 
distribute” business model, banks had no risk from making 
poor quality loans.230 In fact, the converse was true. The riskier 
loans generated higher fees and were more profitable.231 Simi-
larly, small businesses reduced their reliance on bank loans, 
using alternative financing sources such as credit cards and 
home equity lines on residences.232 
Competition from capital markets fundamentally altered 
the traditional banking business model. In response to these 
fundamental changes, the banking regulators, over a thirty-
year period, administratively eased or eliminated the Glass-
Steagall prohibitions on riskier bank lending.233 During the 
1980s, the Fed, through its broad exemptive authority, permit-
ted banks, in short succession, to own retail brokerage subsidi-
aries; to own and trade in a holding company proprietary ac-
count any form of equity, debt, or derivative security; to 
underwrite municipal securities; and to underwrite corporate 
securities.234 In 1998 when the Fed gave Citibank a two-year 
exemption from Glass-Steagall in order to complete its merger 
with Travelers Insurance, it made Glass-Steagall repeal a for-
mality.235 Congressional repeal in 1999236 was the equivalent of 
placing a tombstone on the grave that had been dug and closed 
during the preceding two decades.  
While one could argue that banking deregulation was driv-
en by philosophy, a more persuasive argument can be made 
that it reflected the enormous changes in financial intermedia-
tion that occurred. Simply put, banks could no longer rely on 
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traditional lending practices for profitability. Competition from 
capital markets and securitization was too great. Increasingly 
large banks have relied upon transactional business—
investment banking, proprietary trading, mortgage and loan 
origination fees, processing fees, and payment systems for prof-
its.237 In 1987 Willard Butcher, chairman of Chase Manhattan 
Bank, explained, “When I started in the bank 42 years ago 90 
percent of our business came from loans to U.S. corporations. 
Today, they account for less than 4 percent of income.”238 Twen-
ty years later, one must wonder if the figure has declined fur-
ther. 
Not surprisingly, the largest banks are no longer primarily 
lenders. They are financial intermediaries that generate reve-
nue and profits from loan origination and servicing, securitiza-
tion, investment banking, management of investment portfo-
lios, traders of government securities and foreign currencies 
and as the dominant participants in the OTC derivatives mar-
ket.  
The banks’ role in the derivatives market, and its impact 
on the financial crisis, warrants particular attention. During 
the 1990s the federal financial regulators decided to forbear di-
rect regulation of this newly emerging business sector.239 Con-
gress codified this regulatory forbearance in 2000.240 By 2009 
the top five banks controlled over ninety-five percent of all de-
rivatives contracts.241  
The impact of bank participation in the OTC derivatives 
market can best be understood by considering one form of de-
rivative, the CDS. While subprime lending is frequently identi-
fied as the bottom-line cause of the financial crisis, in fact, 
CDSs were the accelerant that caused the fire to envelop the 
entire system.242 Credit default swaps are a derivative that is 
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marketed as insurance against a loss due to a default by the is-
suer of a security.243 However, while insurance products may 
only be sold to persons with an “insurable interest,” a demon-
strable loss that the insurance policy will cover, anyone may 
purchase a CDS.244 An insurance company is limited to writing 
only the amount of insurance for which it has sufficient re-
serves to cover estimated probabilities of loss.245 A company 
writing a CDS is not similarly limited.246 Because a CDS is a 
contract, it is backed only by the financial balance sheet of the 
issuer and the amount of collateral negotiated by the purchas-
er.247 When it collapsed, AIG had open CDS positions with a 
notional value of $2.7 trillion dollars ($1 trillion was concen-
trated with twelve counterparties).248 At its peak, the CDS 
market was worth roughly $60 trillion, ten times the face value 
of the securities insured.249 When the benefits of a default are 
ten times greater than the value of the default, it is an invita-
tion for disaster. 
The expansion of banks into these more aggressive and 
riskier business segments may reflect a strategic plan of ag-
gressive growth. But it also may reflect the declining profitabil-
ity of the traditional banking model due to the growth of securi-
tization and competition from nonbanks. 
Although the bank business model changed fundamentally, 
the regulatory system did not. Banking regulators continued to 
focus on traditional responsibilities of bank minimum capital 
requirements and the loan portfolio on the bank’s balance 
sheet. Highly concentrated loan portfolios to be used for future 
securitizations were not consolidated. The nonbank mortgage 
origination process was unregulated, as was the OTC deriva-
tives market. In a 2009 speech, Fed Governor Daniel Tarullo 
acknowledged the regulatory failure to adequately oversee 
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these new and important business segments: “Truthfully, 
though, there was no wholesale transformation of financial 
regulation to match the dramatic changes in the structure and 
activities of the financial industry.”250 
2. The U.S. Banking Sector Has Experienced an 
Extraordinary Consolidation in Three Decades—the Implicit 
Government Protection of “Too-Big-to-Fail” Banks Provides an 
Important Competitive and Financial Advantage 
For three decades, banking in the United States has be-
come more concentrated, with a small number of the largest 
banks increasingly dominating the industry. In 1984 only 
twenty-four commercial banks had more than $10 billion in as-
sets.251 Ten years later, in 1994, the number was sixty-four.252 
During that period, total assets at these banks had risen from 
$865 billion to $1.94 trillion.253  
Not surprisingly, between 1990 and 2005 there were seven-
ty-four bank mega-mergers (the acquiring and acquired banks 
both held more than $10 billion in assets).254 During this pe-
riod, the combined share of banking industry assets of the ten 
largest banks grew from twenty-five percent to fifty-five per-
cent.255 Between 1998 and 2007, the five largest U.S. banks—
Bank of America, Citigroup, JPMorgan Chase, Wachovia, and 
Wells Fargo—all made acquisitions and their combined assets 
more than tripled (from $2.2 trillion to $6.8 trillion).256 
This trend continues. Between 2007 and 2009 Bank of 
America grew thirty percent to $2.3 trillion, JPM grew twenty-
five percent to $2.0 trillion, and Wells Fargo doubled in size to 
$1.2 trillion.257 In 1995, the combined assets of the six largest 
banks equaled less than twenty percent of U.S. GDP.258 In 
2009, the combined assets of the six largest banks was greater 
than sixty percent of GDP.259 In 1994, the Fed adopted a regu-
lation prohibiting any bank from having ten percent of all na-
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tional retail deposits.260 In 2010 the three largest banks each 
controlled more than ten percent of all retail deposits.261 All 
three obtained waivers from the Fed.262 
The investment banking firms grew in the same way. Be-
tween 1997 and 2007, Goldman Sachs assets grew from $178 
billion to $1.1 trillion and Morgan Stanley grew from $302 bil-
lion to more than $1 trillion.263 The comparable growth by Bear 
Stearns and Lehman has already been discussed.264  
The reason for this dramatic consolidation is not because 
larger banks are better banks. Simon Johnson and James 
Kwak highlight a 2007 study coauthored by Roger Ferguson 
(former Vice Chairman of the Fed) that “found that the unprec-
edented consolidation in the financial sector over the previous 
decade had led to no significant efficiency gains, no economies 
of scale beyond a low threshold, and no evident economies of 
scope.”265  
It appears that the real reason for banking consolidation is 
the greater profitability of too-big-to-fail banks due to implicit 
government protection. A recent academic study concluded that 
the belief in an implicit government guarantee of the largest 
banks dramatically reduces the cost of capital for the largest 
banks. This study concluded that today the eighteen largest 
banks borrow at rates 0.78 percent lower than smaller 
banks.266 During the period from 2000 to 2007, the spread was 
0.29 percent.267 This study calculated that this lower cost of 
capital was worth up to $34 billion for the eighteen largest 
banks in 2009, roughly half of their reported profits.268 The 
FCIC Staff report describes a study by the Bank of England 
that reached the same conclusion. “The study estimated that 
the 26 global banks received an implicit subsidy of $37 billion 
in 2007—of which $18 billion accrued to the five largest 
banks—in the form of reduced funding costs due to lower [in-
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terest] rates paid on bonds and other ratings-sensitive whole-
sale liabilities.”269 
There is additional evidence that the lower lending costs 
for the largest banks are based upon the implicit government 
subsidy rather than lower likelihood of failure. The history of 
bank failures in this country demonstrates that the largest 
banks have a greater risk of failure at a greater cost. “For ex-
ample, although only 1 percent of failed institutions from 1986 
to 1994 had more than $5 billion in assets, those banks made 
up 37 percent of the total assets of failed institutions and ac-
counted for 23 percent of [Bank Insurance Fund] losses during 
that period.”270 Is it surprising that banks see major benefits in 
growth for growth’s sake?  
C. WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED FROM FOUR DECADES OF BANK 
FAILURES? WHAT HAVE WE DONE? 
The financial failures discussed in section A demonstrate a 
common pattern in financial failures. The substantial changes 
in the business of banking and in the consolidation of the in-
dustry described in section B provide insight into the increas-
ing size and complexity of these failures. Section C will consid-
er what can be learned from these events, what to expect when 
future crises inevitably occur, and several regulatory changes 
that have been adopted or should be considered. 
1. Financial Crises Are Not Unforeseeable “Black Swans”—
When Banks Aggressively Grow Their Balance Sheets and Fuel 
Them with “Hot Money”—They Are Candidates for Failure 
“I would be the first to acknowledge that some things have 
changed in our financial markets, but financial crises continue 
to occur for the same reasons as always—over-optimism, exces-
sive debt and leverage ratios, and misguided incentives and 
perspectives—and our solutions must continue to address these 
basic problems.”  
—Thomas Hoenig, President, Federal Reserve 
Bank of Kansas City271 
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The summary of major bank failures is remarkably consis-
tent. A bank achieves dramatic growth in its business and bal-
ance in a short period of time. It makes large, high-risk loans 
that promise high returns. The loans are supported by large 
wholesale deposits, obtained by offering above-market interest 
rates or by borrowing money on a short-term basis, often from 
other financial institutions. In both cases, the source of funds 
can disappear overnight if depositors make withdrawals or 
lenders refuse to extend or “roll over” loans. This is “hot mon-
ey.” Inevitably, high-risk loans fail at a greater rate than con-
servative loans and the hot money is gone when trouble ap-
pears. Similarly, when a bank relies upon aggressive leverage 
to fuel lending growth, a series of loan failures or large trading 
losses will effectively wipe out the capital cushion. In both cas-
es, a bank failure ensues.  
The series of failures previously discussed focused on 
banks. An expanded list of financial failures would have in-
cluded Drexel Burnham Lambert in 1990,272 Baring Brothers in 
1995,273 and Long-Term Capital Management in 1998.274 One 
might also add to this list the series of sovereign debt crises: 
the Latin debt crisis of the early 1980s,275 Mexico in 1994,276 
the Asian debt crisis in 1997,277 Russia in 1998,278 and Iceland, 
Ireland, Greece, and Portugal during the most recent crisis.279  
The frequency and variety of these failures over the past 
three decades demonstrates that financial crises are not “black 
swans” or “long tails.”280 They are not once in a generation 
events that cannot be foreseen. Accordingly, regulatory policy 
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must seriously monitor banks that exhibit unusually rapid 
business and balance-sheet growth.  
Because the pattern of aggressive expansion through risky 
lending leading to bank failure appears so strong, one must ask 
the question—why do some bank executives choose high-risk 
strategies? While not the entire answer, the linkage between 
stock-performance-based executive compensation and bank 
growth must be considered. In 2009 congressional testimony, 
Professor Simon Johnson discussed the dramatic rise in bank 
compensation: “From 1948 to 1982, average compensation in 
the financial sector varied between 99% and 108% of the aver-
age for all domestic private industries. From 1983, it shot up-
ward in nearly a straight line, reaching 181% in 2007.”281 John-
son and Kwak highlight the rise in compensation for CEOs of 
the largest banks and investment houses over two decades. In 
1985, the annual compensation of John Gutfreund, CEO of Sal-
omon (at the time the most prominent firm on Wall Street) was 
$5.8 million (inflation adjusted to 2009 dollars).282 In 2007 
Lloyd Blankfein (Goldman Sachs) received $54 million, Jamie 
Dimon (JPMorgan) received $34 million, John Thain (Merrill 
Lynch) received $84 million, and John Mack (Morgan Stanley) 
received $41 million.283 While the payment of large bonuses 
and compensation packages was suspended following the finan-
cial crisis and the enactment of TARP, it proved to be fleeting. 
The SIGTARP report of January 2010 stated that “although 
there have been some improvements in the form that bonus 
compensation takes for some executives, there has been little 
fundamental change in the excessive compensation culture on 
Wall Street.”284 
Absent fundamental changes in the business of banking or 
in the system for compensating persons who determine bank 
business strategies, one must conclude that there will be finan-
cial crises in the future. 
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2. In a Crisis, a Regulator Will Invariably Act to Prevent a 
Systemic Failure, Even if It Exacerbates the Problem of Moral 
Hazard 
“It is a fantastical notion to expect that having once pulled 
poorly run, systemically threatened firms out of the fire, gov-
ernment won’t do it again, no matter how many times and how 
loudly it says it won’t.” 
—Richard Fisher, President, Federal Reserve 
Bank of Dallas285 
 
Notwithstanding the isolated case of Lehman (a decision 
likely based upon the outcry over Bear Stearns), moral hazard 
is a concern that rarely determines regulatory decisions. How-
ever, it continues to have a powerful effect on Congress. In 
1991, Congress attempted to restrict similarly regulators’ abili-
ty to bail out the uninsured creditors and depositors.286 The 
least-cost resolution provisions of the Federal Deposit Insur-
ance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 (FDICIA) “barred 
the FDIC from approving any transaction that would protect 
uninsured depositors or other uninsured creditors in a failed 
bank unless that transaction represented the least costly reso-
lution option available to the FDIC.”287 However, the systemic 
risk exemption “permits the FDIC to protect uninsured deposi-
tors or other uninsured creditors of a failing bank if such pro-
tection would avoid or mitigate ‘serious adverse effects on eco-
nomic conditions or financial stability.’”288 Similarly, section 
13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act permits the Fed to authorize a 
Reserve Bank to lend in “unusual and exigent” circum-
stances.289 As discussed, non-TARP intervention by the Fed 
likely had a far greater impact on stopping the financial panic 
and ameliorating its consequences than the congressionally ap-
proved TARP intervention.290 Once again, in the Dodd-Frank 
Act, Congress has attempted to restrict regulators’ discretion to 
intervene by imposing limits on the ability of the FDIC to en-
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gage in bailouts of uninsured creditors.291 It remains to be seen 
whether this will have the full desired effect.  
Because regulators typically seem to find a way to take any 
action they deem necessary to stem a financial crisis, the dis-
cussion of regulatory intervention policy should focus on how 
the intervention occurs rather than if it should occur. In partic-
ular, attention should focus on the types of intervention and 
the consequences of government intervention. Federal Reserve 
Bank of Kansas City’s President Thomas Hoenig recommends 
this approach. Under his approach, regulators would be re-
quired to place insolvent institutions in receivership, fire man-
agement, and engage in an orderly transfer or disposition of as-
sets.292 “Too large” banks would be dismantled and sold off in 
parts.293 Shareholders and unsecured creditors (including unin-
sured depositors) would be treated just as they would under the 
bankruptcy code.294 The TARP strategy of providing federal 
funds and allowing existing management to stay in place, sub-
ject to government micromanagement and “strings attached,” 
would be prohibited.295  
The lessons of the financial crisis for government seem 
clear. Insolvent banks should be put into some form of receiver-
ship, with a rapid and orderly disposition of assets. Manage-
ment should always be removed. There should be equally 
shared sacrifice by all creditors, even those deemed systemical-
ly significant. The terms of the government’s contribution 
should be more, not less, onerous than a private sector inter-
vention.296 
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3. In a Too-Big-to-Fail Environment, Regulators Must 
Reexamine How They Monitor and Regulate Bank Risk 
“[E]ven if TARP saved our financial system from driving off 
a cliff back in 2008, absent meaningful reform, we are still driv-
ing on the same winding mountain road, but this time in a fast-
er car.”  
—Neil Barofsky, Special Inspector General for TARP297 
 
“If stupidity got us into this mess, then why can’t it get us 
out?” 
—Will Rogers, commenting on the crash of 1929298 
 
Mr. Barofsky offered his pessimistic view in 2010, prior to 
congressional passage of the Dodd-Frank regulatory reform 
law. This Act, which is over 2300 pages in length, purports to 
address the flaws and failures that contributed to the financial 
crisis.299 However, unlike Glass-Steagall and the other depres-
sion-era laws that imposed outright prohibitions on activities 
that were believed to have contributed to the financial crisis of 
1929, Dodd-Frank creates a Financial Stability Oversight 
Council and empowers it, in conjunction with the various gov-
ernment regulators, to determine which activities should be re-
stricted or prohibited and what, if any, structural changes 
should be required.300 Until the federal agencies have com-
pleted the mandatory studies and adopted regulations in areas 
required by the law, it is impossible to assess or even predict its 
impact. In effect, an assessment of Dodd-Frank today would be 
the equivalent of writing a restaurant review based upon the 
restaurant menu, before the food is prepared, let alone served 
and eaten. 
Dodd-Frank addresses the problem of too-big-to-fail banks 
in several ways. For example it requires large banks (and sys-
temically important nonbank financial companies) to prepare a 
plan for orderly resolution (analogous to a living will).301 The 
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Act also requires the Fed to consider, in any bank merger, its 
impact on the financial stability of the United States and the 
Fed must determine that the acquiring bank is well capitalized 
and well managed.302 In very limited circumstances, when a 
systemically important bank or nonbank financial company 
poses a “grave threat” to financial stability, the Financial Sta-
bility Oversight Council may—by a two-thirds vote (which 
must include the Secretary of the Treasury)—place restrictions 
on banking activities or require the company to sell off assets or 
subsidiaries.303 As is typical of the Act, these provisions provide 
regulatory discretion.304 While regulators in the near term may 
carefully monitor the size of banks, the long history of banking 
regulation has reflected support for bank mergers and consoli-
dation, particularly in response to a crisis. 
Similarly, Dodd-Frank provides expansive authority to ag-
gressively regulate bank risk taking. Under the Act, the Fed is 
authorized to adopt higher prudential standards for banks with 
assets above $50 billion dollars.305 Dodd-Frank also empowers 
the Fed to set higher risk-based minimum capital requirements 
for banks and, for the first time, countercyclical capital levels 
for bank-holding companies.306 
While it is difficult to argue against higher capital re-
quirements, one must not assume that this will solve the prob-
lem. The magnitude of the problem will inevitably be influ-
enced by the stability of the capital. As the history of banking 
crises demonstrates, demand deposits (particularly wholesale 
jumbo deposits) and capital secured by short-term borrowing in 
the repo market may disappear in a crisis.307 Also, if the assets 
purchased on leverage or funds loaned are highly risky, a sud-
den dramatic fall in market prices or loan defaults may wipe 
out even a substantial capital cushion.  
Higher minimum capital requirements may also increase, 
rather than decrease, other forms of risk taking. As discussed, 
when bank executives are compensated through stock, it 
creates a substantial incentive to increase short-term perfor-
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mance.308 One of the leading metrics for measuring bank per-
formance is total return on equity (ROE).309 Simply put, when a 
bank is required to retain higher levels of reserve capital, ROE 
will fall unless a higher return on assets (ROA) is generated. 
Higher ROA typically can only be attained by engaging in 
higher-risk lending or trading. Therefore, a bank executive 
seeking higher stock performance will be motivated to engage 
in riskier banking practices in order to attain the same ROE.  
Because a higher capital requirement may have the unin-
tended consequence of encouraging greater risk taking, it is 
important for regulators to reexamine the methods for calculat-
ing and regulating risk. In particular, regulators should reex-
amine their reliance upon value at risk (VaR) models to meas-
ure capital adequacy and their acquiescence in bank reliance on 
derivatives such as CDSs to hedge risk. While VaR models are 
useful at measuring and predicting known, quantifiable risks, 
the past crisis demonstrated the danger of using these models 
to measure the unquantifiable and unanticipated “long tail” 
risks.310 Furthermore, because each firm has substantial lati-
tude to develop its VaR, and more importantly to control the 
data that is entered into the calculation, it is dangerous for 
regulators to rely upon it exclusively.311 
Most importantly, in a too-big-to-fail world, regulators 
must focus on regulating bank business segments that inher-
ently have a higher risk component. For example, the much-
publicized Volcker Rule, which ostensibly will prohibit banks 
from engaging in proprietary trading and will limit bank spon-
sorship or investment in hedge funds, is a notable example of 
this approach.312  
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Dodd-Frank also provides for regulation of OTC deriva-
tives. In doing so, it authorizes the Commodity Futures Trad-
ing Commission and the SEC to establish minimum margin re-
quirements for most swap transactions.313 However, it does not 
address the problem of multiple CDSs written on a single secu-
rity. As such, it will continue to be possible for exponentially 
more investors to benefit from a credit default than would ben-
efit from full payment of the obligation. 
  CONCLUSION   
While the magnitude of the financial crisis in 2008 was 
unprecedented, it followed a predictable pattern. Overly ag-
gressive financial houses grew too rapidly by borrowing in the 
short term and committing too much capital into a bubble mar-
ket of securities and derivatives built on subprime mortgages. 
The government predictably responded by engineering govern-
ment-financed and assisted takeovers designed to halt a panic. 
To the extent that the government engaged in well-established 
techniques of lending money against sound collateral, and in-
tervening in the secondary market to reestablish market pric-
ing, the process worked. The banks were recapitalized. While 
the secondary debt markets are not fully recovered (and may be 
overly dependent on the Fed as a buyer), at least they are func-
tioning.  
Who benefited from the bailout? The narrow answer to the 
question would be that the creditors and counterparties of 
Bear, AIG, and the CPP banks on the verge of failure were the 
principle beneficiaries. Unlike the creditors and counterparties 
of Lehman, they received one hundred cents on the dollar. Ex-
ecutives and other employees in the financial sector were also 
major beneficiaries. Bonuses were paid in most instances and 
the compensation system in the financial sector continues, 
largely as is. As a nation, we benefited by averting a financial 
meltdown. In retrospect, the cost of the bailout was not great. 
Even when factoring in the enormous non-TARP interventions 
by the Fed and others, the final cost may be surprisingly small. 
Of course, the shareholders in Bear, Lehman, AIG, Wachovia, 
Washington Mutual, and others suffered. 
Looking to the future, did our nation’s financial system 
benefit? The verdict on systemic beneficiaries is less positive. In 
all likelihood, the underlying problems have not been ad-
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dressed. While the Dodd-Frank Act provides regulators with 
greatly expanded authority, it remains uncertain how this 
power will be used. Banks that are too big to fail are larger to-
day and, as such, future failures will be greater. Executive 
compensation practices that encourage bank management to 
seek growth at any cost have not been addressed. An unlimited 
number of investors lacking an insurable interest in a security 
can still buy derivative “insurance” with the consequence that a 
failure of one MBS will result in a profitable return that is ex-
ponentially greater than the value lost on the underlying secu-
rity.  
 
Plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose. 
